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GATT MEMBERSHIP FOR TAIWAN: AN
ANALYSIS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
YA QIN*
I. INTRODUCTION
On January 1, 1990, Taiwan formally applied for acces-
sion to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT)' in the name of "Customs Territory of Taiwan,
Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu"-the four main islands cur-
rently under the control of the Nationalist government in
Taipei. 2  Taiwan's GATT application has encountered
strong opposition from the government of the People's Re-
public of China (PRC), whose request for resuming China's
GATT membership has been put on hold since June 1989.3
* Attorney, Hughes Hubbard & Reed. LL.B. 1983, Beijing Univer-
sity; LL.M. 1985, S.J.D. 1990, Harvard Law School.
1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
1103, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT]. Technically, the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade refers both to the text of the treaty and
the institution that has evolved from the treaty. It is, however, customary
to refer to the institution as the "GAIT" and the treaty as the "General
Agreement" or the "Agreement." KENNETH W. DAM1, THE GATT: Law
AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 3 n.1 (1970). GATT mem-
bers are technically "contracting parties" to the General Agreement. Arti-
cle XXV:1 of the General Agreement provides that the contracting parties
acting jointly are designated as the "CONTRACTING PARTiEs." Accordingly.
the term "contracting parties" in lower case refers to the individual mem-
ber countries, whereas the same term, "Contracting Parties," in initial cap-
italized form is often used in GATT documents to refer to the GATT in
general. See OLIVIER LONG, LAW AND ITS LiMhTATiON IN THE GATT MTuI-
LATERAL TRADE SYSTEM 6 n.15 (1985).
2. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, China. [here-
inafter FBIS, China] 90-004, at 53 (Jan. 5, 1990).
3. The PRC government made a formal request on July 14, 1986 to
resume China's status as an original contracting party to the GATT. Com-
municationfrom the PRC, GATT Doc. L/6017 (July 14, 1986). The negotia-
tions on China's status in GATT became stalled after the drastic deteriora-
tion in China's relations with many Western countries following the
Tiananmen incident ofJune 4, 1989. Although the GATT Working Party
on China resumed its meeting in December 1989, little progress has been
made in view of the stagnating economic reforms in China after June 4.
1989. See Jeanne-Marie C. Gescher, G.47Ts Problem with China, FAR E.
ECON. REV., Jan. 11, 1990, at 46.
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The PRC government claims that, as a matter of interna-
tional law, Taiwan has no right to apply for accession to
GATT on its own, and that Taiwan's application for GATT
membership can be dealt with only (i) after China's con-
tracting party status in GATT is resumed and (ii) upon Bei-
jing's approval. 4
The question of whether GATT should admit Taiwan
independently of Beijing has stimulated a great deal of inter-
est and enthusiasm in the public as well as in political cir-
cles.5 After more than a year of silence, the U.S. President,
George Bush, joined the U.S. Congress in pledging support
for Taiwan's application over the summer of 1991.6 Subse-
quently, the European Community and certain other GATT
countries reportedly also expressed their positive attitude to-
ward Taiwan's accession. 7
Apparently, the political and economic implications of
Taiwan's GATT membership would be quite significant.
Taiwan is one of the major trading powers8 as well as one of
4. Frances Williams &Jonathan Moore, W1ho Goes First? Taiwan's GATT
Application Angers Peking, FAR E. ECON. REV., Feb. 1, 1990, at 36. See al5o
Mainland Official on Taiwan Joining GATT, BEIJING REV., Aug. 27-Sept. 2,
1990, at 39.
5. For example, there was an ongoing debate in the New York Times
regarding the issue. See Taiwan: Too Big to Ignore, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 10,
1990, at A22; Zhao Xixin, Taiwan Can't Act Alone in International Affairs, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 2, 1990, at A18; Chen Guoqing, Taiwan Can't Independenlyjoin
GATT, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1990, at A24; Taiwan Belongs in GATT, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 27, 1991, at A24; see also Raymond Chang, Taiwan Should Be
Allowed to Join GATT, ASIAN WALL ST.J. WKLY., Oct. 15, 1990, at 16.
6. In his letter of July 19, 1991 to Senator Max Baucus, President
Bush wrote: "The U.S. will begin to work actively with other contracting
parties to resolve in a favorable manner the issues relating to Taiwan's
GATT accession." It was reported that by linking Taiwan's GATT bid
with the most-favored-nation (MFN) status of Beijing, Bush's move won
the senators' support for his position on unconditional extension of the
MFN status to the PRC. Susumu Awanohara, Trick or Treat?, FAR E. ECON.
REV., Aug. 8, 1991, at 8;Julian Baum, Taiwan Welcomes US Support on GATT
Application: A Favour of Sorts, FAR E. ECON. REv., Aug. 8, 1991, at 8.
7. See, e.g., EC Supporting Taiwan for GATT, FREE CHINA J., July 26,
1991, at 1.
8. In 1990, Taiwan had a total foreign trade volume of US$121.9 bil-
lion, ranking as the world's 15th largest trading power, and foreign ex-
change reserves of US$74 billion. Taiwan's GNP per capita was US$7,990
in fiscal year 1990. See FREE CHINAJ., Sept. 13, 1991, at 3; FREE CIIINAJ.,
June 21, 1991, at 6.
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the fastest growing economies in the world. With a popula-
tion of only 20 million, Taiwan's total volume of trade is
larger than that of the PRC.9 GATT membership for Tai-
wan, therefore, would subject a major trading power to
GATT discipline. For the many trading partners of Taiwan,
this means that Taiwan would be obligated to improve mar-
ket access by lowering tariff rates and removing licensing re-
quirements and other trade barriers, to liberalize its financial
service market, and to improve its record on intellectual
property protection. For Taiwan itself, GATT membership
not only would bring a stable most-favored-nation treatment
in its trade with other GATT member countries and provide
it with an international forum for resolving its trade disputes,
but also-perhaps more importantly-would enhance Tai-
wan's international status and add to its currently limited of-
ficial ties with the international community.
Policy considerations aside, however, the membership
question of an international organization is also a legal ques-
tion. Because of the unique history of the Beijing-Taipei
legal battles over government recognition and the ambigu-
ous status of Taiwan in international law, Taiwan's applica-
tion for GATT membership and Beijing's strong opposition
confront the GATT contracting parties with some intriguing
legal issues. These issues require clarification before the
question of Taiwan's GAT membership can be resolved. It
is the purpose of this article to provide a legal analysis of the
issues involved, thereby helping clarify any confusion in this
area.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Taiwan's Ambiguous Status in International Law
In 1949, a change of government took place in China as
the result of a popular revolution. The Nationalist govern-
ment of the Republic of China was overthrown and forced to
flee to the island of Taiwan. The new government declared
the founding of the People's Republic of China on October
1, 1949.
9. In 1990, the PRC's foreign trade totaled US$ 115.4 billion. CHINA
ECON. NEWS, Mar. 18, 1991, at 5. For the total trade volume of Taiwan in
the same year, see supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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With the founding of the PRC in 1949 began a long-
term battle over the issue of government recognition, i.e.,
which Chinese government is the legitimate government and
therefore has the right to represent China in international
organizations. Despite its loss of control over the territory of
mainland China, the deposed Nationalist government in Tai-
wan continued to claim its status as the sole legitimate gov-
ernment of China, a claim that prevailed in the United Na-
tions and other major international organizations until 1971.
1. The 1971 U.N. Resolution
A dramatic change came in 1971 when the United Na-
tions General Assembly passed Resolution No. 2758 (XXVI)
(the 1971 U.N. Resolution), declaring its recognition of the
PRC government as the legal representative of China to the
United Nations and a concomitant decision to "expel the
representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the place which
they unlawfully occupy at the United Nations and in all the
organizations related to it."1 Pursuant to this Resolution,
the PRC government has replaced the Nationalist govern-
ment in the China seat in the United Nations as well as other
U.N.-related international organizations. The 1971 U.N.
Resolution laid down the foundation for the current status of
the PRC and Taiwan in the international community.
The recognition of the PRC government as the legiti-
mate government of China conforms with international legal
principles on government recognition. Under international
law, the essential criterion for recognizing a government that
came into power through force is whether the government
has established effective control over most of the territory of
the state and whether such control is likely to continue.'I It
was clear in the case of China that the PRC government had
10. Resolution on Representation of China, G.A. Res. 2758, U.N.
GAOR, 26th Sess., Supp. No. 29, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971).
11. For general theory and state practices regarding the prerequisites
and legal effects of recognition of governments in international law, see
Prerequisites, 2 WHITEMAN DIG. § 4; Recognition of Governments, 2 id. §§ 61-65;
HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 87-136
(1947); TI-CHIANG CHEN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF RECOGNITION 97-
130 (L.C. Green ed., 1951). For discussions on recognition of the PRC
government and its effects in international law, see Chen Tiqiang, The Peo-
ple's Republic of China and Problem of Recognition, 3 CHINESE Y.B. INT'L L.
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established its effective control over most of the territory of
China and had the support of the majority of the Chinese
population after 1949.
Since the adoption of the 1971 U.N. Resolution, Tai-
wan's status in international law has been ambiguous.12 On
the one hand, Taiwan has lost most of its diplomatic rela-
tions and is isolated from most of the intergovernmental or-
ganizations;13 on the other hand, it has been acting interna-
tionally as an independent entity, maintaining commercial
and cultural exchanges with most countries in the world.' 4
The Taipei government continues to commit itself to the
"one China" policy and condemns any attempt to establish
an independent state of Taiwan.
2. Beijing-Taipei Relations
Relations between Beijing and Taipei have undergone
significant changes in the last decade. Stark hostility and
mutual exclusion have been replaced by cautious politeness
and dialogue. The beginning of this transformation came on
(1985); Legal Implications of Recognition of the People's Republic of China. 72
PROC. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 240 (1978).
12. See Victor H. Li, The Law of Non-Recognition: The Case of Taiwan, I
Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 134 (1979). See also Hungdah Chiu, Certain Legal
Aspects of Recognizing the People's Republic of China, 11 CASE W. RES.J. INTeL L
389, 412-16 (1979).
13. As of 1990, Taiwan maintained diplomatic relations with about two
dozen states, including most of the Central American countries, several
African countries including South Africa, a few Pacific island countries,
and South Korea. ROC's Embassies and Consulates, 4 ZHONGGUO GuoJiFA Yu
Guoji SHIwu NIANBAO [ANNUAL REPORT OF CHINESE INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS] [A.R.C.I.L.I.A.] 477 (1990). The intergov-
ernmental organizations in which Taiwan retained its participation were
fewer than ten, including the International Union for the Publication of
Customs Tariffs, the International Criminal Police Organization. the Inter-
national Office of Epizootics, the International Cotton Advisory Commit-
tee, the Asian Productivity Organization, the Afro-Asian Rural Recon-
struction Organizations and the Asian Development Bank. See Hungdah
Chiu, Legal Problems in ROCs Participation in Inter-Govenmental Organizations,
4 A.R.C.I.L.I.A. 52 (1990). For Taiwan's admission to the Asian-Pacific
Economic Cooperation in 1991, see infra text accompanying note 27.
14. It was reported that Taiwan had commercial relations with more
than 140 countries and trading areas as of 1990. FREE CHINAJ., Sept. 13.
1990, at 3. For a general introduction to Taiwan's foreign relations and
policy, see JOHN F. COPPER, TAIWAN: NATION-STATE OR PROVINCE? ch. 6
(1990).
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New Year's Day, 1979, when the PRC's Standing Committee
of the National People's Congress issued a message to the
people in Taiwan proclaiming a new policy of peaceful unifi-
cation. On September 30, 1981, the chairman of the Stand-
ing Committee of the National People's Congress issued an
elaboration on the policy of the PRC government concern-
ing peaceful unification. ' 5 The elaboration set forth nine ba-
sic principles which call for the establishment of Taiwan as a
special administrative region enjoying a high degree of au-
tonomy, including the right to retain its own armed forces,
and for the preservation of Taiwan's current social and eco-
nomic system after the unification. From Beijing's perspec-
tive, the policy of "one country, two systems" (meaning co-
existence of different social and economic systems within
one united China), formulated as the solution to the status of
Hong Kong after its return to China, is also applicable to
unification with Taiwan. In the years following Beijing's pro-
posals, indirect trade, investment, and other economic and
social contacts between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits
have flourished. '6
Taipei's initial response to Beijing's proposals was nega-
tive and defensive. However, this posture eventually
changed. On May 1, 1991, Taipei officially terminated the
forty-three-year-old "Period of Mobilization for Suppression
of the Communist Rebellion," thereby declaring peace with
Beijing.' 7 Although direct commercial contacts with the
mainland are still officially banned, Taipei has tacitly ap-
proved indirect trade (mostly via Hong Kong) and private
investment in mainland China. Delegations of quasi-official
status from Taiwan have visited the mainland to meet with
mainland officials, and unofficial communications have been
established to handle problems that might arise in exchanges
15. Y'eJianyingon Reunification With China, FBIS, China, No. 189, at UI-2
(Sept. 30, 1981).
16. Indirect trade between the mainland and Taiwan reached US$4 bil-
lion in 1990, of which US$3.2 billion was the mainland's import from Tai-
wan. Julian Baum, Strait Expectations: Taiwan Businessmen Prepare for Direct
Trade with China, FAR E. ECON. REV., June 6, 1991, at 41. Taiwan's total
investments on the mainland are estimated at US$2 billion. Mainland
Claims Taiwan Largest Investor There, FREE CHINAJ., May 5, 1991, at 3.
17. ROC Terninates Hostility Toward Peking, FREE CHINA J., May 2, 1991,
at 1.
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across the Taiwan Straits.' 8
Officially, however, both Beijing and Taipei recognize
the other side as an "authority" only, not a "government,"
to avoid any legal implication of recognizing the other's le-
gitimacy. In international settings, Beijing is apparently will-
ing to accept Taipei as a legitimate local government
subordinate to Beijing. Taipei, however, refuses to accept
such a position, but is willing to sacrifice its official name in
order to achieve more realistic objectives of international
recognition and participation.
3. Co-axistence in International Organizations
After the 1971 U.N. Resolution settling the status of the
PRC government as the representative of China in U.N.-re-
lated organizations, the battle between Beijing and Taipei on
the issue of government representation in international or-
ganizations has been transformed into a game of names.
Beijing formulated a policy that Taiwan's presence in inter-
national affairs, official or unofficial, should be in the name
of "Taiwan, China" or "Taipei, China" in order to avoid any
possible misinterpretation that there exist in the world "two
Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan." The name of "Taipei,
China" has been referred to as the Olympic formula, since it
was first adopted by the International Olympic Committee
(IOC), a universal, non-governmental organization, in
1979.19 After some resistance, Taipei accepted the use of
this formula by IOC in 1981.
The co-membership of Beijing and Taipei governments
in the Asian Development Bank (ADB) beginning in 1986
marked the first official compromise between the two rivals
with respect to participating in inter-governmental organiza-
18. A quasi-official liaison body of the Taipei government, the Straits
Exchange Foundation, was set up in March 1991 to handle non-political.
routine technical matters involving problems that might arise in contacts
with the mainland. Its delegation had its first trip to the mainland in late
April 1991, which opened "unofficial but formal relations with Pcking."
Straits Exchange Foundation on Job in Peking; 'Historic' Contact .Made. FREE
CHINAJ., May 2, 1991, at 1.
19. For a description of the name battle in the IOC, see David S. Chou.
The ROCs lemnbeship Problems in International Organizations, AsIA OUTLOOK.
May-June 1991, at 18, 21-24.
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tions.20 Founded in 1966, the ADB is engaged in promoting
the economic and social progress of its developing member
countries in the Asia-Pacific region. The ADB is owned by
forty-seven governments, of which thirty-two are from the
Asia-Pacific region and fifteen from Europe and North
America.2 1 Taiwan, in the name of the Republic of China
(ROC), was one of the founding members of the ADB. 22
In February 1986, the ADB Board of Governors passed
Resolution No. 176 admitting the PRC to the membership of
the ADB and changing the designation of Taiwan from
"ROC" to "Taipei, China," a name formula accepted by the
PRC.23 Taiwan protested vigorously against the ADB's deci-
sion and boycotted ADB's annual meetings in 1986 and
1987.24 Despite its protestations, however, Taiwan retained
its membership in the ADB and returned to its annual meet-
ing in 1988.25 Thus, although Taiwan has never officially ac-
cepted its name change, the co-membership of Beijing and
Taipei in the ADB created a precedent of co-existence be-
tween the two rival Chinese governments in an intergovern-
mental organization. 26
20. The co-existence solution was only reached after a prolonged bat-
tle between the PRC and Taiwan and with backing by the United States.
See William Feeney, Chinese Policy in Mlultilateral Financial Institutions, in
CHINA AND THE WORLD: CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY IN THE POST-MAo ERA
266, 286-87 (Samuel S. Kim ed., 1984). During the course of the battle,
Beijing changed its stand from demanding an expulsion of Taiwan from
the ADB to agreeing to Taiwan's participation under an acceptable name.
For a chronology and analysis of the event, see Peter K.H. Yu, On Taipei's
Rejoining the Asian Development Bank (ADB) Subsequent to Beijing's Entry: One
Country, Two Seats?, ASIAN AFF.: AM. REV., Spring 1990, at 3.
21. See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, ANNUAL REPORT (1991).
22. Taipei emphasized at the time of its joining the ADB that it repre-
sented the Taiwan area only, in anticipation of potential problems of gov-
ernment representation with other ADB members, as many of them were
shifting their recognition to Beijing. See Yu, supra note 20, at 7.
23. ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, ANNUAL REPORT 163 (1986).
24. Yu, supra note 20, at 8.
25. In May 1989, to the surprise of many, Taiwan's official delegation
attended the ADB annual meeting held in Beijing. This was the first time
in 40 years that officials from Taiwan set foot on mainland China. See Yu,
supra note 20, at 10.
26. The International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) is
another intergovernmental organization in which Beijing and Taipei both
have a presence. Taipei rejoined INTERPOL in 1961. In 1984, IN-
TERPOL accepted the PRC's membership and changed the ROC's name
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
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The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) has re-
cently become the second intergovernmental organization in
which both Beijing and Taipei participate as equal mem-
bers.27 Established in 1989 to promote greater cooperation
among the Pacific Rim's fast-growing economies, APEC had
twelve original members: Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the
Philippines, Singapore, Brunei, South Korea, Japan, the
United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Based
on a compromise agreement worked out with both Beijing
and Taipei,28 APEC was able to admit the PRC, Taiwan
(under the name of Chinese Taipei) and Hong Kong simulta-
neously to the organization at its ministerial meeting held in
November 1991.29
B. China's Status as a Contracting Party to GATT
1. An Original Contracting Party to GA7T
China was one of the twenty-three nations that signed
the Final Act of October 30, 1947 authenticating the text of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.30 The Gen-
eral Agreement, however, has never entered into force.3' In-
to "Taiwan, China" and the ROC's status was "downgraded to a sort of
associate membership." Chou, supra note 19, at 21. However, the co-
existence of Beijing and Taipei in INTERPOL and the ADB differs sub-
stantially in that INTERPOL allows only one vote from one country. As a
result, Taipei's representative can participate only as part of the Chinese
delegation and has no right to vote. See id at 21. See generally Chiu, supra
note 13, at 412-19 (discussing the impact on the ROC of the widespread
international recognition of the PRC).
27. ShimJ. Hoon & Robert Delfs, Block Politics, FAR E. EcON. REv., Nov.
28, 1991, at 26.
28. Damon T. Darlin, APEC Resolves "'Three Chinas" Problem but Stniggles
to Define its Own Function, AsIAN WALL ST.J. WKLY., Sept. 2, 1991, at 16.
29. It was reported that the PRC delegation to APEC told reporters
that the APEC practice with respect to the co-membership of the three
Chinese parties "would not be applicable to other international bodies."
APEC Endorsement Gives GATT Talks on Broad Trade Liberalization a Boost.
AsiAN WALL ST.J. WKLY., Nov. 18, 1991, at 16.
30. GATT, supra note 1, 55 U.N.T.S. at 198. See GAIT, Introduction to
ANALYTICAL INDEX: NoTEs ON THE DRAFTING, INTERPRETATION AND APPLI-
CATION OF THE ARTICLES OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT 4 (4th ed. 1989)
[hereinafter ANALYTICAL INDEX].
31. Under article XXVI:6, the General Agreement will ener into force
after governments representing a certain minimum share of world trade
have accepted it. See GATT, supra note 1, art. XXVI(a), 55 U.N.T.S. at
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
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stead, it was first brought into application through the con-
clusion of the Protocol of Provisional Application in 1947
(the 1947 Protocol), 32 and subsequently through a series of
protocols of accession.33 The 1947 Protocol was signed by
all but one of the twenty-three signatories of the Final Act of
October 30, 1947. 34 The twenty-two governments thereby
276, amended by 62 U.N.T.S. 80, 102 (1948). Only two governments, Haiti
and Liberia, have ever deposited their instruments of acceptance in ac-
cordance with article XXVI, and Liberia later withdrew. See ANALYTICAL
INDEX, supra note 30, art. XXVI, at 11, § 9.
32. GATT, supra note 1, 55 U.N.T.S. at 308, reprinted in 4 GATT: BASIC
INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 3, 77-78 (1969) (hereinafter
BISD]. The decision to apply the General Agreement on the basis of the
1947 Protocol was the product of a particular set of historical circum-
stances. The General Agreement was originally negotiated parallel to the
Havana Charter of the International Trade Organization (ITO), the com-
prehensive international trade agreement, which has never entered into
force. The purpose of having a separate trade agreement (GATT) negoti-
ated simultaneously was to ensure immediate tariff reductions. By the
time the negotiations of the General Agreement were near completion in
1947, the Havana Charter negotiations were still in progress. To protect
the results of tariff concessions, it was deemed necessary to put into effect
the General Agreement as soon as possible. However, the General Agree-
ment incorporated certain provisions of the draft Havana Charter into
Part II of the General Agreement, and some delegates indicated their lack
of authority to negotiate these provisions. In order to prevent the delay of
implementing the General Agreement, a compromise was reached that
Part II would be applied only to an extent not inconsistent with existing
legislation. The conclusion of the Protocol of Provisional Application ena-
bled incorporation of those compromises and brought the General Agree-
ment into immediate application to the largest extent possible. See JOHN
H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GAIT: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF
THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE 61-62 (1969) (citing U.N.
Doc. E/PC/T/100 (1947), U.N. Doc. E/PC/T'IAC/PV/I (1947), and
U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/TAC/SR/4 (1947)).
33. The subsequent protocols of accession to GATT contain provisions
similar to the 1947 Protocol. See, e.g., Protocol for the Accession of the Philip-
pines to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT Doc. L/4901 (1979),
reprinted in BISD, supra note 32, at 192 (26th Supp. 1979).
34. According to its provisions, the 1947 Protocol was to be signed by
the eight governments named therein (Australia, Belgium, Canada,
France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the
United States) by November 15, 1947, and applied by them on and after
January 1, 1948, and was to remain open for signature until June 30, 1948
by the signatories to the Final Act. All the government signatories but
Chile signed the 1947 Protocol by the cutoff date. Chile became a GA'T
contracting party shortly afterwards through accession by signing the Pro-
tocol for the Accession of Signatories of the Final Act of October 30, 1947,
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became the original contracting parties to GATT, and China
was one of them.35
2. The 1950 "Withdrawal"
Shortly after the deposed Nationalist government relo-
cated to Taiwan, it notified the U.N. Secretary-General on
March 6, 1950 of its decision to withdraw from the General
Agreement on behalf of China.3 6 The withdrawal was made
in accordance with article 5 of the 1947 Protocol, with the
effective date of May 5, 1950.37 China's schedule of tariff
concessions (Schedule VIII), which had been made an inte-
gral part of the General Agreement by virtue of its article
11:7, was accordingly terminated.38
Different opinions were expressed within GATT on the
validity of the withdrawal at the time.39 The representative
of Czechoslovakia, for instance, challenged the validity of the
withdrawal on the ground that the Nationalist government
lacked competent authority to represent China.40 No official
on February 14, 1948. See GATT, STATUS OF LEGAL INSTRUMENTS 3-1.1;see
also JACKSON, supra note 32, at 91.
35. The Nationalist government of the Republic of China deposited its
Instrument of Acceptance of the 1947 Protocol on April 21, 1948. The
provisional application of the General Agreement to China therefore took
effect on May 21, 1948, 30 days after the deposit in accordance with article
3 of the 1947 Protocol.
36. Communication from Secretay-General of United Nations Regarding China,
GATT Doc. CP/54 (Mar. 6, 1950).
37. GATT, supra note 1, 55 U.N.T.S. at 196.
38. Between 1950 and 1962, 14 GATT contracting parties withdrew
the concessions they had originally negotiated with China. See F. Liser,
China and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, in JoIT ECON. Co.utm.,
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, CHINA UNDER THE FOUR MODERNIZA-
TIONS pt. II, at 138-39 (1982).
39. Summary Record of the Sixth Meeting of the Tariff Negotiations Committee,
GAIT Doc. TN.2/SR.6 (Nov. 13, 1950).
40. Id. According to this Record, the Czech representative proposed to
include in the Torquay Protocol, which omitted China from the list of con-
tracting parties in its preamble, a note to the same CffcCt as "the note
which appeared in the United Kingdom official publication of the text of
the General Agreement, viz. 'The Nationalist Government of the Republic
of China has notified its withdrawal from the General Agreement with ef-
fect from May 5, 1950; The Central People's Government of China has not
* yet defined its position with regard to the General Agreement.' Id. at 2.
The proposal was rejected by the Chairman on the ground that it was un-
necessary to mention the point in the Protocol. Id. at 3. The Czech repre-
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decision was taken in GATT on the issue. Yet, subsequent
GATT documents consistently treated China as a withdraw-
ing contracting party.4'
3. GATT Decisions of 1965 and 1971
In 1965, the Nationalist government requested observer
status in GATT in the name of the Republic of China.42 In
discussing the matter, a number of GATT contracting par-
ties stated that they recognized the PRC government as the
legitimate government of China.43 The Chairman of the
CONTRACTING PARTIES evaded the issue by announcing that
the admission of observers "did not prejudice the position of
the CONTRACTING PARTIES or of individual contracting par-
ties towards recognition of the government in question."
44
Observer status thereupon was granted.
sentative also suggested that an inquiry be sent to Beijing on their attitude
toward the General Agreement. Id. at 2.
41. See, e.g., ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 30, Protocol, at 13, § 5; id.,
Contracting Parties, at 1 n.2. Both places list "Republic of China" as one
of the contracting parties that have given notice of their withdrawal from
the General Agreement.
42. See GATT Doc. SR.22/3 (Mar. 16, 1965). Observer status in GATT
can be granted on request under articles 8 and 9 of the Rules of Procedure
for Sessions of the Contracting Parties. See BISD, supra note 32, at 10, 11
(12th Supp. 1964). It may be valid for sessions of the Contracting Parties,
or also for the GATT Council and its subsidiary bodies, except for the
Committee on Budget, Finance and Administration. Observer countries
do not have the right to vote. Upon invitation, they can take part in de-
bates. In practice, they are called upon to speak after contracting parties
have spoken. See LONG, supra note 1, at 46.
43. They included Czechoslovakia, Cuba, Yugoslavia, France, the
United Kingdom, Sweden, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, the United
Arab Republic, Poland, Indonesia and Pakistan. GATT Doc. SR.22/3,
supra note 42, at 2-3.
44. Id. at 3. The Chairman explained the basis of his statement, noting
that the CONTRACTING PARTIES had followed the policy expressed in article
86 of the Havana Charter, namely to avoid passing judgment in any way
on essentially political matters and to follow decisions of the United Na-
tions on such questions. He went on, stating that the opinion of the Legal
Department of the United Nations was that "the question of representa-
tion in an international organization was distinct from the question of rec-
ognition of a government by other members of that organization." He
also quoted from a memorandum by the U.N. Secretary-General to the
Security Council on March 9, 1950: "[tlhe members have therefore made
clear by an unbroken practice that (1) a member could properly vote to
accept a representative of a government which it did not recognize, or with
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In November 1971, the 1965 decision on observer status
was re-examined in the first meeting of the twenty-seventh
.session of the CONTRACTING PARTIES, following the passage
of the 1971 U.N. Resolution recognizing the representatives
of the Government of the PRC as the sole legal representa-
tives of China to the United Nations.45 The Chairman of the
CONTRACTING PARTIES, upon recalling the GATT policy to
follow the decisions of the United Nations on essentially
political matters, suggested that the CONTRACTNG PARTIES
decide that "the Republic of China should no longer have
observer status" in GATT.46 A decision of the CONTRACTING
PARTIES tO this effect was made through a consensus de-
clared at the meeting.47 It was reported that the PRC gov-
ernment expressed its appreciation of the GATT decision,
but did not take any step in regard to China's status in
GATT.4 8
4. PRC's Request for Resumption
It was not until the late 1970s, when the PRC govern-
ment initiated an "open policy" and inaugurated economic
reforms at home, that the PRC began to show some interest
in GATT.49 Subsequently, in 1982, the PRC government
formally requested to observe the thirty-eighth session of the
Contracting Parties. The communication from the PRC gov-
ernment carefully stated that "this request is without preju-
dice to the position of the Government of the People's Re-
public of China with regard to its legal status vis-a-vis the
which it had no diplomatic relations, and (2) such a vote did not imply
recognition or a readiness to assume diplomatic relations." Id
45. See Summary Record of the First Meeting, GATT Doc. SR.27/1 (Nov.
19, 1971).
46. Id. at 2.
47. 1 d at 3. Note that no request for a vote on the question was made.
After the Chairman declared the consensus, however, the representatives
of Brazil, the United States, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Greece. South Africa, and
Madagascar, respectively, expressed their disagreement with the decision
and their disassociation from the consensus. Id. at 3-4.
48. See Feeney, supra note 20, at 285. See also Chung-Chou Li. Resump-
tion of China:s GATT Membership, 21 J. WORLD TRADE L. 25, 27 (1987).
49. The initial official contact with GATT was made in 1980, which re-
sulted in the attendance of a Chinese trade official in the GATT commer-
cial policy training course. See Li, supra note 48, at 28.
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General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade." 50 The request
was approved by GATT, with a large number of representa-
tives speaking in support.5 1 In 1984, the PRC government
requested and received observer status in meetings of the
Council of Representatives and its subordinate bodies; 52
since then China has been attending GATT meetings regu-
larly in the capacity of an observer.
In June 1986, the PRC asked to participate in the forth-
coming Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations. 53
Shortly thereafter, on July 14, 1986, the PRC government
formally requested resumption of its status as a contracting
party in GATT.54 In its communication to the Director-Gen-
eral of GATT, the PRC government advised that it had de-
cided to seek the resumption of its status as a contracting
party to GATT, was prepared to enter into negotiations with
GAT contracting parties on the resumption of its status as
a contracting party, and that to this end, would provide in-
formation on its economic system and foreign trade re-
gime.5
5
A Working Party on China's Status as a Contracting
50. GATT Doc. L/5344 (July 5, 1982).
51. A similar request was made in 1983, and again approved. See
GAIT Doc. L/5549; GATT Doc. C/M/173.
52. GATT Doc. L/5712 (Oct. 26, 1984); GATT Doc. C/M/183, at 4.
The Council of Representatives is the intersessional body of the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES. It has the authority to take up all questions the Con-
tracting Parties deal with at their sessions, as well as any urgent matter. It
oversees the work of the various subsidiary GATT bodies. The Council is
open to all contracting parties that request its membership. See BISD,
supra note 32, at 8 (9th Supp. 1961); see also LONG, supra note 1, at 47;
GATT Doc. C/M/160, at 2 (Sept. 24, 1982).
53. Li, supra note 48, at 39. The PRC was admitted to full participation
in the Uruguay Round under the Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay
Round. BISD, supra note 32, at 19 (33d Supp. 1987). Part I.F(a)(iv) of the
Declaration provides that the Uruguay Round negotiations are open to
"countries that have already informed the CONTRACTING PARTIES, at a reg-
ular meeting of the Council of Representatives, of their intention to nego-
tiate the terms of their membership as a contracting party." Id. at 27. The
provision was said to accommodate China's situation in particular. Id.
54. It was the hope of the PRC government that combining the new
round of multilateral trade negotiations with the negotiations for its
GATT membership would facilitate the process of its reentry into the
GATT. BISD, supra note 32, at 19 (33d Supp. 1987).
55. Communication fiom the PRC, supra note 3.
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Party was established by the Council on March 4, 1987 to
"examine the foreign trade regime of the People's Republic
of China" and "develop a draft Protocol setting out the re-
spective rights and obligations." 56 Substantial progress in
negotiations on PRC's GATT membership was underway
before June 1989.
5. Taiwan's Application for GATT Membership
OnJanuary 1, 1990, in the midst of the negotiations on
PRC's membership in GATT, the Taipei government sub-
mitted its application for Taiwan's accession to GATT under
article XXXIII of the General Agreement. The most signifi-
cant aspect of this application is the fact that it was made in
the name of "Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen
and Matsu."57 It was reported that the Taipei government
hoped that by using the term "customs territory," the appli-
cation would meet with fewer "unnecessary disturbances. "5
Another significant feature of Taiwan's application is that it
announces its intent to join GATT as a "developed" econ-
omy rather than as a developing economy, the latter being
entitled to exceptions from many GATT obligations under
current GATT policy.59 This expression of "good will" is
expected to help Taiwan win GATT members' support for
its membership application.
III. LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS
The PRC government has taken the position that Tai-
wan cannot legally join GATT independently. In supporting
this position, the PRC's advocates have provided the follow-
ing legal arguments and rationales. Taiwan's application to
join GATT as a separate customs territory can only be con-
sidered after the PRC resumes China's status as a con-
tracting party to GATT because (i) Taiwan is an inalienable
part of China, and cannot function as a political entity inter-
nationally; and (ii) Taiwan cannot accede to GATT under ar-
56. See GATT Doc. L/6191/Rev.2 (Apr. 26, 1988).
57. FBIS, China, supra note 2, at 53.
58. Id.
59. By contrast, the PRC's application specifically stated that it "ex-
pects to receive treatment equivalent to that accorded to other developing
contracting parties." Communication from the PRC, supra note 3.
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ticle XXXIII of the General Agreement in view of the fact
that there is no precedent in GATT history that a regional
government may utilize article XXXIII to join GATT. Con-
sequently, Taiwan's participation in GATT must be spon-
sored by the PRC. To do otherwise, the PRC advocates ar-
gued, would result in recognition of "two Chinas" or "one
China, one Taiwan," a situation that would lead to an unac-
ceptable national division.60
Before analyzing the legal issues raised by these argu-
ments, the PRC's concern with the "two Chinas" problem
must be addressed. As is well known, the Taipei government
consistently has insisted on the "one China" policy. Taipei
applied for GATT membership in the name of the "customs
territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu" precisely
to avoid the "two Chinas" problem. It seems therefore
groundless to talk about the danger of "two Chinas" or "one
China, one Taiwan," when Taipei has clearly refused to
claim either the status of another China or that of an in-
dependent state of Taiwan in its application for GATT mem-
bership.
A. May Taiwan Join GA TT Independently?
The central legal issue raised by the PRC's arguments is
whether under international law Taiwan may accede to
GATT in its own right. In order to answer this question, we
need to look at both GATT law and the international law of
treaties.
1. Qualifications of a GA TT Contracting Party
a. Governments of Autonomous Customs Territories
Unlike the United Nations and many other international
organizations, GATT does not require its members to be
sovereign states. 61 The term "contracting parties" is defined
60. See 11ainland Official on Taiwan Joining GATT, supra note 4, at 39;
Zhao Xixin, supra note 5; Chen Guoqing, supra note 5; Yushu Feng, One
GATT, Two Systems, FAR E. ECON. REV., Mar. 8, 1990, at 48.
61. Article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations provides: "Member-
ship in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which
accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judg-
ment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obliga-
tions." U.N. CHARTER art. 4, para. 1. Most U.N.-related organizations re-
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
1074
GATT MEMBERSHIP FOR TAISI10
in article XXXII of the General Agreement as "governments
which are applying the provisions of this Agreement under
articles XXVI or XXXIII or pursuant to the Protocol of Pro-
visional Application." 62 A drafting document of the General
Agreement explains: "Contracting Parties were defined as
'governments,' and not as 'States' or 'nations' so that gov-
ernments with less than complete sovereignty could be a
contracting party to GATT.' 63 Thus, as a matter of GATT
law, a GATT contracting party is a "government," and is not
necessarily a government of a sovereign state. In fact, three
of the twenty-two original contracting parties to GATT-
Burma, Ceylon (Sri Lanka) and Southern Rhodesia-were
not independent nations at the time the General Agreement
was drafted.6 4 A more recent example is Hong Kong, which
became an independent GATT member in 1986.65
The qualifications of a contracting party are set forth in
article XXXIII and article XXVI:5(c), the two articles that
provide procedures under which a government may join
GATT. According to both provisions, a government is quali-
fied to become a contracting party when it acts on behalf of a
"customs territory" that possesses "full autonomy in the
conduct of its external commercial relations and of the other
matters provided for in this Agreement. " 66
quire their members to be states. See FREDERIC L. KIRGIS, JR., INTERNA-
TIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THEIR LEGAL SETTING: DOCUMENTS, CO.MMEh"Fs
AND QUESTIONS 100-05 (1977).
62. Paragraph I of article XXXII provides: "The contracting parties to
this Agreement shall be understood to mean those governments which are
applying the provisions of this Agreement under Article XXVI or pursuant
to the Protocol of Provisional Application." GATT, supra note 1. art. XX-
XII:1, 55 U.N.T.S. at 282.
63. PREPARATORY COMM. OF THE U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND Em-
PLOYMENT, REPORT OF THE AD Hoc SuB-COMM. OF THE TARIFF AGREEMFIT
COMM., U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/198 (1947); PREPARATORY CoMM.. OF THE U.N.
CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND EMPLOYMENT, VERBATIM REPORT, 22D MEET-
ING OF THE TARIFF AGREEMENT Commi. 21-22, U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/TAC/
PV/22 (1947). See also ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 30, art. XXXII, at 1.
64. See JACKSON, supra note 32, at 96.
65. For a detailed discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 77-82.
66. For a comparison of the two provisions, see inra text accompany-
ing notes 95-96, 110.
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b. Rationale of GATT Membership Qualifications
The particular eligibility requirements of a GATT mem-
ber are determined by the purposes and the nature of
GATT. The essence of GATT lies in the willingness of the
contracting governments to restrict themselves from impos-
ing barriers to their countries' external trade. Within the
GATT framework, the contracting parties negotiate to re-
move or reduce the maximum level of tariff rates, quotas and
other trade restrictions they may maintain with respect to
specific goods that their countries may trade with each other.
Once the maximum level of restrictions is agreed upon, the
contracting parties are bound thereby. In particular, each
contracting party has its own schedule listing the maximum
tariff rates it may charge on its imports and exports; all the
schedules are annexed to the General Agreement and are
made an integral part thereof.67 Hence, the ability to negoti-
ate and fulfill these concrete GATT obligations is essential to
a GATT member.
Given the nature of GATT obligations, a contracting
party first of all must be a government representing a cus-
toms territory that maintains its own tariffs and other trade
restrictions. Second, the government must be responsible
for the tariff and non-tariff trade restrictions of this territory
so that it will be in the position to remove or reduce them.
Only the undertakings of such governments are meaningful
for GATT's purposes. Obviously, a government that has no
control over the trade regulations of a territory is not in the
position to undertake the GATT obligations on behalf of this
territory.6 8
67. Article I:7 of the General Agreement states: "The Schedules an-
nexed to this Agreement are hereby made an integral part of Part I of this
Agreement."
68. As a practical matter, it is apparently not in the interest of a govern-
ment to be held responsible for the trade conduct of a territory over which
it has no real control. This explains why the deposed Nationalist govern-
ment of China withdrew from GATT shortly after it lost effective control
over mainland China. By comparison, the same Nationalist government
remained in the China seat in the United Nations and many other interna-
tional organizations until it was replaced by the PRC government in 1971.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
1076
GATT MEMBERSHIP FOR TAIMIN
2. Does Taiwan Meet the Eligibility Requirements of GATT
Membership?
It is a matter of fact that (i) Taiwan is a separate customs
territory-it maintains its own customs and applies its own
import and export tariffs; and (ii) Taiwan enjoys full auton-
omy in conducting its external economic and commercial re-
lations-no other country or government in the world has
control over Taiwan's foreign trade and economic relations.
Thus, under the GATT membership eligibility test, the only
remaining question is whether the government that acts on
behalf of the customs territory of Taiwan is qualified to do
so. In light of the history of China's problem with govern-
ment recognition and the fact that GATT terminated the ob-
server status of the Taipei government following the 1971
U.N. Resolution, it seems necessary to clarify whether the
same Taipei government may legally represent Taiwan to
join GATT.
From a standpoint of legal necessity for GATT pur-
poses, the Taipei government is the only authority that is
qualified to join GATT on Taiwan's behalf. As already ex-
plained above, for GATT purposes the GATT contracting
parties must be responsible for the trade barriers of particu-
lar customs territories and thus are capable of undertaking
GATT obligations to remove or reduce those barriers. For
this reason, if Taiwan is ever to participate in GATT as a
separate customs territory, the government that is qualified
to represent Taiwan in GATT must be the one that is re-
sponsible for imposing the trade barriers in Taiwan. Obvi-
ously, since Beijing has nothing to do with Taiwan's customs
tariffs or other trade restrictions and has no control over Tai-
wan's conduct in its external commercial relations and other
GATT-regulated matters, the PRC government is unable to
undertake GATT obligations for Taiwan.
The fact that GATT once terminated the observer status
of the Taipei government on the ground of its illegitimacy
does not necessarily have any bearing on the Taipei govern-
ment's current application for GATT membership. From a
legal standpoint, the two situations are distinct from each
other. Taipei obtained GATT observer status as the govern-
ment of "Republic of China" in 1965, and GATT decided in
1971 that it would follow the U.N. General Assembly resolu-
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tion and disallow Taipei to continue acting in such capacity
in GATT. At present, Taipei is applying for GATT member-
ship in an entirely different capacity, i.e., on behalf of the
customs territory of the Taiwan area not China. Therefore,
the question of which government is the legitimate represen-
tative of China is not an issue in the present situation, and
there will be no legal inconsistency on the part of GATT if it
decides to accept the application of the Taipei government
for GATT membership. Thus, Taiwan appears to meet the
eligibility requirements of GATT membership as manifested
in the plain text of the General Agreement, and Taiwan's
membership in GATT is justified by the purposes and nature
of GATT obligations.
3. Is GA TT Membership for Taiwan "Legal" Under
International Law?
Notwithstanding the perspective of GATT law, we need
to analyze further this issue on the plane of public interna-
tional law. As a legal institution, GATT is based on a multi-
lateral treaty69-the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade-and its organization evolved from this underlying
treaty.70 In essence, the issue of GATT membership for Tai-
wan is an issue of Taiwan's legal capacity to enter into multi-
lateral treaty relations.
a. International Legal Theories and Practice
It is generally accepted in international law that subjects
of international law possess treaty-making capacity. A sub-
ject of international law is "an entity capable of possessing
international rights and duties and endowed with the capac-
ity to take certain types of action on the international
plane." 7' Such entities are also commonly referred to as "in-
69. Unless specified otherwise, the word "treaty" is used throughout
this article as a generic term, inclusive of all legal instruments entered into
between governments that are governed by international law. For domes-
tic law purposes of individual countries, there may be strict distinctions
between a treaty and an agreement in terms of their legal effects and pro-
cedures of approval. For instance, under the Constitution of the United
States, "treaty" has a specific meaning and effect. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2,
cl. 2.
70. See LONG, supra note 1.
71. Louis HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
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ternational persons" or entities with "international personal-
ity." These terms-subject of international law, interna-
tional personality, and treaty-making capacity-are used
often as equivalents of each other for the purpose of identi-
fying an entity's international legal status. Under the tradi-
tional view, only sovereign states are international legal per-
sons and possess treaty-making capacity. Development of in-
ternational practice in the contemporary world has widened
the concept of international legal personality beyond the
state,72 although it is not clear how broad the concept has
become. While the international personality of international
organizations and non-self-governing peoples generally have
been accepted, disagreement exists as to whether certain
other entities, such as constituent states of a federal union,
multinational corporations, or even individuals, may also
possess some degree of international personality.7" How-
ever, for the purpose of determining whether a particular
non-state entity has treaty-making capacity under interna-
tional law, it seems that the only applicable criterion is inter-
national practice itself. As one legal theorist pointed out:
It may, indeed, be doubted that international law
contains any objective criteria of international per-
sonality or treaty-making capacity. The very act or
practice of entering into international agreements is
sometimes the only test that can be applied to de-
termine whether an entity has such personality or
168 (1980). The International Court of Justice has defined a subject of
international law as an entity "capable of possessing international rights
and duties and [which] has the capacity to maintain its rights by bringing
international claims." Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of
the United Nations, 1949 I.CJ. 174 (Apr. I1).
72. "The widening of the concept of international legal personality be-
yond the state is one of the more significant features of contemporary in-
ternational law." HENKIN Er AL., supra note 71, at 168.
73. The entities that are considered to have certain international per-
sonalities include: international organizations and their agencies, intcrna-
tional territories, non-self-governing peoples, emergent and defunct states
and belligerent and insurgent communities, and for some purposes, indi-
viduals. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 61
(3d ed. 1979); HENKIN ET AL., supra note 7 1, ch. 4. By contrast, the PRC's
mainstream view recognizes three subjects of international law only:
states, international organizations, and nations in the stage of fighting for
independence. See INTERNATIONAL LW TE.oTBoOK 85 (T. Wang ed.. 198 1).
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capacity, or, indeed, "statehood. '74
In international practice, for a non-state territorial entity
to enter into a treaty relation with foreign states, two condi-
tions are generally present: (i) the state that is responsible
for the foreign relations of the non-state territorial entity has
given its consent, either through a constitutional arrange-
ment or an international agreement with foreign states; and
(ii) other parties to the treaty accept the participation of the
non-state territorial entity. For instance, all Republics of the
Soviet Union were recognized as subjects of international
law by the Soviet constitution, among which only the Ukrain-
ian S.S.R. and the Byelorussian S.S.R. became members of
the United Nations and were parties in their own rights to
numerous multilateral treaties. 75 Many colonial territories,
before attaining independence, entered into treaty relations
with foreign states, with the consent of their dominant
states 76
Hong Kong's independent membership in GATT pro-
vides a recent example of a non-state territorial entity's entry
into treaty relations. Never in history has Hong Kong been
an independent state. It was a Chinese territory and became
a British colony in the nineteenth century; in accordance
with the 1984 Sino-BritishJoint Declaration on the Question
of Hong Kong, it will be returned to China in 1997. 7 7 With
the sponsorship of the British government, Hong Kong be-
came a separate contracting party to GATT in 1986. 78 A
question arises as to whether Hong Kong will continue to
possess the legal capacity to be an independent contracting
party to the General Agreement after it becomes a
74. Oliver J. Lissitzyn, Efforts to Codify or Restate the Law of Treaties, 62
COLUM. L. REV. 1166, 1183 (1962), dted in HENKIN ETAL.,supra note 71, at
595.
75. HENKIN ET AL., supra note 7 1, at 594.
76. See OliverJ. Lissitzyn, Territorial Entities Other Than Independent Slates
in the Law of Treaties, 125 RECUEIL DES COURS 1 (1968).
77. Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's
Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong, Dec. 19, 1984, U.K.-
P.R.C., 23 I.L.M. 1371 [hereinafter Joint Declaration].
78. Accession of Hong Kong, Succession, GATT Doc. L/5976 (Apr. 23,
1986), reprinted in BISD, supra note 32, at 27 (34th Supp. 1988).
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subordinate administrative region of China in 1997.79 In
this case, Hong Kong's contracting party status in GATT will
be retained, because the PRC government, which will be re-
sponsible for Hong Kong's foreign relations after 1997, has
given its express consent to a limited treaty-making capacity
of Hong Kong, including specifically the capacity to maintain
its own GATT membership. The PRC's consent was first
given in its agreement with the British government in
1984,80 then in its unilateral statement to GATT in 1986,1'
and finally in the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Ad-
ministrative Region, adopted by the PRC legislature in
1990.82 Thus, it is based on the PRC's international commit-
ment and particular constitutional arrangement that Hong
Kong will maintain its treaty-making capacity with respect to
certain subject matters after becoming an administrative re-
gion of the PRC.
b. Taiwan's Treaty-Making Capacity
Taiwan, however, presents a different situation. For the
79. Note that China is not a federal union. Hong Kong will become a
Special Administrative Region of the PRC in accordance with article 31 of
the Constitution of the PRC. Joint Declaration, supra note 77, art. 3(1). 23
I.L.M. at 1371.
80. TheJoint Declaration provides that the government of Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region will enjoy a high degree of autonomy, in-
cluding the rights to retain the status of free port and a separate customs
territory, and to maintain economic and cultural relations and conclude
relevant agreements with states, regions and relevant international organi-
zations on its own under the name "Hong Kong, China." Joint Declara-
tion, supra note 77, art. 3(6), 3(10), 23 I.L.M. at 1372. Annex I to theJoint
Dedaration, Elaboration by the PRC Government on its Basic Policies Re-
garding Hong Kong, made a special reference to GATT in article VI
thereof: "The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be a sepa-
rate customs territory. It may participate in relevant international organi-
zations and international trade agreements (including preferential trade
arrangements), such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and
arrangements regarding international trade in textiles." Id annex I, 23
LL.M. at 1375.
81. The PRC's statement referred to the Sino-British joint Declaration
and notified the GATT that, with effect from July 1, 1997, the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region "may, using the name of 'Hong Kong.
China,' continue to be deemed to be a contracting party to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade." GATT Doc. L/5987 (Apr. 24. 1986).
82. Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the
People's Republic of China art. 116, 29 I.L.M. 1520, 1538 (1990).
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purpose of determining its treaty-making capacity under in-
ternational law, Taiwan can only be considered as a non-
state territorial entity, as both Beijing and Taipei agree that
Taiwan is a province of China, not an independent state.
Although some commentators consider Taiwan as a de facto
state,83 it is not useful for the purposes of international law
to argue that Taiwan actually possesses the legal requisites
of a state, for it seems certain that no entity is a state that
does not assert itself to be such.8 4 The pertinent inquiry
should therefore be made into whether Taiwan as a non-
state entity has certain international legal personality.
As a non-state territorial entity, Taiwan is sui generis in
terms of its treaty-making capacity. Ordinarily, as a compo-
nent territory of China, Taiwan should acquire its treaty-
making capacity by the consent of the central government of
China, either through certain constitutional arrangements or
by virtue of an international agreement entered into by
China with other states. But in this case, it is impossible to
apply this theory since Taiwan is controlled by the political
rival of the internationally recognized legal government of
China. Although Taipei no longer claims itself to be the sole
legitimate Chinese government internationally, it still holds
itself out as an equal rival of the PRC government, not the
government of a subordinate administrative region of China,
and it certainly will not take orders from Beijing.8 5 Thus,
short of an agreement between Beijing and Taipei, one can-
not expect to resort to any constitutional arrangement in or-
83. See, e.g., R. Sean Randolph, The Status of Agreements Between the Amen-
can Institute in Taiwan and the Coordination Councilfor North American Affairs, 15
INT'L LAw. 249, 256 (1981).
84. See CLIVE PARRY ET AL., ENCYCLOPAEDIC DICTIONARY OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 375 (1986).
85. The current PRC-Taiwan relations have entered into a post-civil
war era. Although the PRC government still refuses to renounce the use
of force as a means to achieve unification with Taiwan, the two sides are no
longer in the de facto or de jure state of civil war, which was waged more
than 40 years ago. One can say that the de facto belligerency ended when
the PRC army stopped its routine firings at the Kinmen Island following
the initiation of the PRC's peaceful unification proposals in the late 1970s.
The abolishment of the "Period of Mobilization for Suppression of the
Communist Rebellion" on the part of Taiwan on May 1, 1991 marked the
official ending of the de jure belligerency between the two sides of the
Taiwan Straits.
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der to determine Taiwan's treaty-making capacity or interna-
tional legal personality.
Neither has there been any international legal instru-
ment that may be used to determine the treaty-making ca-
pacity of Taiwan. Under international law, the PRC-Taiwan
relation is China's "internal affair" with which no foreign
government is supposed to interfere. Thus, as a matter of
international law, the issue may not even become a subject
matter of any international agreement. In reality, with re-
spect to Taiwan, the agreements between the PRC and for-
eign states are only applicable to the extent that the relevant
foreign government recognizes that the PRC government is
the only legitimate government of China and that Taiwan is
part of China.8 6 Such agreements do not define the relations
between the PRC government and the Taipei government
(as the Sino-British agreement did on Hong Kong's relations
with Beijing after 1997) or provide any terms for the unifica-
tion of China. The same is true of the 1971 U.N. General
Assembly Resolution on China.8 7
In practice, under different names and in various capaci-
ties, Taiwan has entered into economic, commercial, cul-
tural, and technical agreements with foreign countries that
have no diplomatic relations with Taiwan,88 and maintained
86. For example, the Joint Communique on the Establishment of Dip-
lomatic Relations Between the United States of America and the People's
Republic of China, January 1, 1979, says with respect to Taiwan: "The
United States of America recognizes the Government of the People's Re-
public of China as the sole legal Government of China. Within this con-
text, the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial,
and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan"; and "[t]he Gov-
ernment of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese posi-
tion that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China." DEP'T ST.
BuLL,Jan. 1979, at 25.
87. Notwithstanding the legal effect of U.N. General Assembly resolu-
tions, the subject matter of the 1971 U.N. Resolution concerns govern-
ment representation of China in the United Nations. It does not address
the issue of Taiwan's status after its expulsion from the Organization.
G.A. Res. 2758, supra note 10, at 2.
88. A question arises as to whether agreements between Taiwan and
foreign countries under unofficial names are indeed treaties. It is gener-
ally accepted in international law that a treaty must be an agreement gov-
erned by international law and not subject to municipal law. See Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 2. 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, 333 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. But what should be the criteria
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its status as a party to a few multilateral treaties.89 For in-
stance, Taiwan has continued to be a member of the Asian
Development Bank after its name was changed from "Re-
public of China" to "Taipei, China," 9 and the name change
has not affected its status as an independent contracting
party to this multilateral inter-governmental treaty. For the
other members of the ADB, maintaining their ADB relations
with Taiwan after its change of name implies that they have
accepted the treaty-making capacity of Taiwan for ADB pur-
poses.
The PRC's own practice with respect to Taiwan's mem-
bership in the ADB is inconsistent with its current position
on Taiwan's membership in GATT. In the case of the ADB,
Taiwan was already a member when the PRC joined in 1986.
Although Taiwan's name was changed to "Taipei, China" at
the PRC's request, this name change can hardly be inter-
preted as the indication of "consent" of the PRC govern-
ment to Taiwan's ADB membership. Taiwan entered into
treaty relations with ADB members without Beijing's ap-
proval when it was, as a matter of international law, a non-
state entity regardless of what name it used at the time.91 If
for determining whether an agreement is governed by international law?
Should it be a matter of the parties' intent, or instead dictated by the na-
ture of the subject matter of the agreement? It appears that at least some
of Taiwan's agreements have apparent attributes of a treaty because the
subject matter of the agreement involves the exercise of government
power. See, e.g., Protocol Concerning Income Tax Exemption on Shipping
Enterprises Between Far East Information Bonn Office and the Taiwan
Committee of the German Economy, Aug. 23, 1988, Taiwan-F.R.G.; Ex-
change of Notes Between the Coordination Council for North American
Affairs and the American Institute in Taiwan Relating to Relief from
Double Taxation on Earnings Derived from the Operation of Ships and
Craft, May 31, 1988, U.S.-Taiwan; Agreement of Air Service Between
Chamber of Commerce of China, Jakarta, and Chamber of Commerce of
Indonesia, Taipei, Nov. 17, 1988, Taiwan-Indon. (specifically referring to
the standard of the Chicago Convention on Civil Aviation of 1944); re-
printed in 4 A.R.C.I.L.I.A. 313, 463-69 (1990); see also Randolph, supra note
83.
89. Chiu, supra note 13.
90. See supra text accompanying note 23.
91. It is particularly significant that Taiwan joined the ADB under the
name of "ROC" but made it clear from the very beginning that its repre-
sentation was limited to the Taiwan area only. See supra note 22 and ac-
companying text.
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Taiwan's legal capacity to maintain its ADB membership af-
ter the PRC joined could be interpreted as the result of Bei-
jing's giving its "consent," then there is no reason why Bei-
jing cannot express its "consent" in the same way to Tai-
wan's GATT membership. The ADB and GATT are both
inter-governmental economic organizations and both multi-
lateral treaties in nature; in both cases, Taiwan acts as a non-
state entity. In the case of GAIT, what the PRC opposes is
the method and timing of Taiwan's application, not Taiwan's
eventual participation in GATT as a separate customs terri-
tory. Thus, if the PRC can agree to Taiwan's separate partic-
ipation in the ADB, it is difficult to see why legally it cannot
accept Taiwan's separate participation in GATT, since it is
always in the position to express its "consent," either now or
at the time of its own entry into GATT, regardless of the
necessity of such consent.9 2
The fact that Taiwan has been independently con-
ducting its foreign relations, notwithstanding the specific
names it has used to do so, is evidence that Taiwan, as a non-
state territorial entity, possesses a certain international per-
sonality. So far as the foreign countries maintaining various
kinds of agreement with Taiwan are concerned, they have
recognized de facto Taiwan's international personality for
certain specific purposes other than political and diplomatic
relations. Such recognition is inevitable for the countries
that wish to have exchanges with Taiwan, since it is practi-
cally impossible for Beijing to conduct foreign relations and
take international responsibility for Taiwan. Given this unu-
sual situation, individual states, as a foreign policy matter,
have to decide whether and how to enter into a treaty rela-
tion with Taiwan on a specific subject matter.93 Thus, the
92. The political implications of the ADB situation arc, however, quite
different from that of GATT. The name change in the ADB was at the
PRC's request, and Taiwan only accepted it with protest, whereas in the
case of GATT Taiwan took the initiative to use the name of a customs
territory, thereby leaving Beijing behind. It is the continuous political
competition between Beijing and Taipei that underlies their contention on
the issue of GATT membership. It is also noteworthy that Belling agreed
to enter into APEC simultaneously with Taipei but refuses to do the same
with respect to GATT membership. See supra note 29 and accompanying
text.
93. The United States may serve as an example. Under the Taiwan Re-
lations Act, enacted after the United States recognized the PRC govern-
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very practice of states has become the only criterion by which
Taiwan's treaty-making capacity and the extent of such ca-
pacity can be determined.
c. The Legal Significance of Taiwan's GA TT Membership
To accept Taiwan as a contracting party to GATT with-
out Beijing's consent would mean that GATT, as an interna-
tional organization, and those GATT countries which agree
to enter into GATT relations with Taiwan, 94 recognize Tai-
wan's treaty-making capacity for GATT purposes. In inter-
national law, GATT membership for Taiwan would add to
the evidence that, as a non-state territorial entity, Taiwan
possesses treaty-making capacity for specific purposes.
However, as far as Taiwan's legal status is concerned, except
for the scope and purposes of the organization, GATT mem-
bership for Taiwan on behalf of "the customs territory of
Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu" is no more legally sig-
nificant than the ADB membership for Taiwan under the ap-
pellation of "Taipei, China." Both GATT and ADB are in-
ter-governmental economic organizations, and Taiwan acts
in each as a non-state territorial entity.
Legally speaking, Taiwan's GATT membership would
not necessarily open the doors of other international organi-
zations to Taiwan's participation. For Taiwan to become a
member of a particular international organization, the con-
stituent treaty of the organization must permit a non-state
entity to participate;95 and the members of the organization
ment as the legal government of China and established diplomatic rela-
tions with the PRC in 1979, all the programs, transactions, and other rela-
tions conducted by the U.S. government with respect to Taiwan are to be
conducted by or through the American Institute in Taiwan, a nonprofit
corporation incorporated under the laws of the District of Columbia. Tai-
wan Relations Act, 22 U.S.C. § 3305 (1988).
94. Under article XXXV of the General Agreement, existing GATT
contracting parties may opt not to apply the General Agreement with an
acceding country.
95. Several major inter-governmental organizations allow a non-state
entity to become an associate member (without the right to vote), includ-
ing the FAO, UNESCO, WHO, and the Inter-Governmental Maritime
Consultative Organization (IMCO). The Universal Postal Union (UPU)
and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) admit non-state terri-
tory members, albeit without clear provisions to that effect. See Chiu, sipa
note 13, at 55.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
1086
GATT MEMBERSHIP FOR TA! W.IN
must decide whether to accept Taiwan for the purposes of
the organization. Nevertheless, to the extent that GATT
membership would testify to Taiwan's international person-
ality for GATT purposes, it would not be inconceivable if
certain other inter-governmental organizations with similar
stature might consider the possibility of Taiwan's paricipa-
tion within the constitutions of their organizations. 96
B. May Taiwan Apply for Accession to GATT
Under Article XXXIII?
The PRC government argued that Taiwan cannot apply
for accession to GATT under article XXXIII because there is
no precedent for a non-state government utilizing article
XXXIII to join GATT. Instead, the PRC suggested, Tai-
wan's participation in GATT should be through article
XXVI:5, which provides for GATT membership by sponsor-
ship of an existing GATT contracting party that has interna-
tional responsibility for the applicant. The significance of
this argument is that if article XXVI:5 is the correct provision
for Taiwan's GATT membership, Taiwan must wait until the
PRC government joins GAIT and offers sponsorship for it,
because under international law the PRC government would
be the party that has "international responsibility" for a ter-
ritorial component of China.
1. Article XXVI:5
Articles XXVI:5 and XXXIII provide two ways in which a
government that is not an original contracting party may be-
come a GATT member. 97 While article XXXIII is applicable
in any general situation, article XXVI:5 is designed in partic-
96. For example, the Articles of Agreement of the International Mone-
tary Fund (IMF) refer to its members as countries rather than states.
"Membership shall be open to the governments of countries at such times
and in accordance with such terms as may be prescribed by the Fund."
Bretton Woods Agreements, Dec. 27, 1945, art. 2, 2 U.N.T.S. 39,42. This
would seem to leave open at least the possibility of arguing that statehood
is not required for IMF membership, as "state" is a well-defined legal con-
cept in international law whereas "country" is not. See KIRGIs, supra note
61, at 105. Note that the members of IMF are eligible to be members in
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World
Bank). Bretton Woods Agreements, supra, art. 2, 2 U.N.T.S. at 136.
97. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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ular for the situation in which a former colonial territory,
which has been applying GATT because a contracting party
has accepted the Agreement on its behalf, becomes in-
dependent in its external commercial relations. In such a sit-
uation, if the customs territory wishes to become an in-
dependent GATT member, it may do so either through a
sponsorship of its former responsible contracting party or by
applying under article XXXIII.98 A major advantage of
sponsored membership under article XXVI:5 is that the new
contracting party is not required to go through new trade
negotiations and make new tariff concessions as will nor-
mally be required of accession under article XXXIII. Hence,
by simplifying the application process and providing a
smooth transition, article XXVI:5 encourages newly in-
dependent countries to stay in GATT.
A recent example of accession under article XXVI:5 is
Hong Kong,99 which, before it became an independent con-
tracting party in 1986, had been applying the General Agree-
ment as a customs territory under the responsibility of the
British government. On April 23, 1986, the GATT Secreta-
riat received a communication from the British government
declaring that Hong Kong, being a separate customs terri-
tory, possessed full autonomy in the conduct of its external
commercial relations and other matters provided for in the
Agreement, and that in accordance with article XXVI:5(c)
and with the wishes of Hong Kong, would be deemed to be a
contracting party to the Agreement from the date of the
communication.100 The communication also called attention
to the fact that, under the Joint Declaration of the U.K. and
the PRC governments, the United Kingdom will restore
Hong Kong to the PRC effective July 1, 1997, and that the
United Kingdom will continue to have international respon-
sibility for Hong Kong until that date.' 0 ' Subsequently, the
GATT Director-General certified that the conditions re-
quired by article XXVI had been met, and a new Schedule
LXXXII, which comprises the concessions specified in the
98. See JACKSON, supra note 32, at 96-100; Tatsuro Kunugi, State Succes-
sion in the Framework of GATT, 59 AM. J. INT'L L. 268 (1965).
99. For a list of other contracting parties that acceded to GATT under
article XXVI:5, see ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 30, art. XXVI, at 6-7.
100. Accession of Hong Kong, Succession, supra note 78.
101. Id.
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Hong Kong Section of Schedule XIX-United Kingdom, was
established for Hong Kong.'0 2
The GATT Secretariat also received a statement from
the PRC government with respect to Hong Kong's in-
dependent membership in GATT on April 23, 1986, which
notified GATT that Hong Kong will become a Special Ad-
ministrative Region of the PRC effective July 1, 1997 and
that the PRC will have international responsibility for Hong
Kong after that date.103 The PRC statement declared that,
effectiveJuly 1, 1997 the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region will meet the requirements for a customs territory to
be deemed a contracting party as prescribed in GATT article
XXVI:5(c), and therefore, using the name of "Hong Kong,
China," may continue to be deemed a contracting party to
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 0 4
The PRC government's statement is legally significant in
that it constitutes a unilateral commitment on its part to-
wards the GATT contracting parties that Hong Kong's status
as a separate customs territory and its autonomy in con-
ducting external economic and trade relations will remain
unchanged after July 1, 1997. The statement, together with
the Joint Declaration with the U.K. Government on the
Question of Hong Kong,10 5 has provided sufficient legal ba-
sis for Hong Kong's continued contracting party status in
GATT, even if the PRC's membership in GATT remains un-
settled on July 1, 1997.106
It should be pointed out, however, that the PRC govern-
ment's statement is legally unnecessary for Hong Kong to
become a separate contracting party, because article
XXVI:5(c) requires only the sponsorship of an existing con-
tracting party that has accepted the General Agreement on
the behalf of the acceding customs territory, which in this
case is the British government. Once a customs territory has
102. Id
103. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
104. Id
105. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
106. A question may be raised as to the legal effect of the PRC's unilat-
eral declaration. It is the author's opinion that the PRC statement will, at
least, have the effect of estopping Beijing from claiming that Hong Kong's
contracting party status will be in question if Beijing remains outside of
GATT by July 1, 1997.
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become a contracting party, it is on equal footing with any
other GATT member including its sponsor, and there is no
need for continuing sponsorship.
The PRC government apparently wishes to deal with
Taiwan's GATT membership in a way similar to its treatment
of Hong Kong. However, a careful reading of the provisions
of article XXVI:5 reveals that they are simply not applicable
to the case of Taiwan:
(a) Each government accepting this Agreement
does so in respect of its metropolitan territory and
of the other territories for which it has international
responsibility, except such separate customs territo-
ries as it shall notify to the Executive Secretary 0 7 to
the Contracting Parties at the time of its own ac-
ceptance.
(b) Any government, which has so notified the
Executive Secretary under the exceptions in sub-
paragraph (a) of this paragraph, may at any time
give notice to the Executive Secretary that its ac-
ceptance shall be effective in respect of any separate
customs territory or territories so excepted and
such notice shall take effect on the thirtieth day fol-
lowing the day on which it is received by the Execu-
tive Secretary.
(c) If any of the customs territories, in respect
of which a contracting party has accepted this
Agreement, possesses or acquires full autonomy in
the conduct of its external commercial relations and
of the other matters provided for in this Agreement,
such territory shall, upon sponsorship through a
declaration by the responsible contracting party es-
tablishing the above-mentioned fact, be deemed to
be a contracting party.
Assuming that the PRC obtains GATT membership
first, and assuming also that the PRC government has inter-
national responsibility for Taiwan, as provided for in para-
107. The title of the head of the GATT Secretariat was changed from
"Executive Secretary" to "Director-General" by a decision of the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES on March 23, 1965. See GATT, THE TEXT OF TIlE GEN-
ERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE preface (1986).
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graph 5(a), the scenario for an attempt to apply article
XXVI:5 to the Taiwan situation would be as follows:
(1) At the time it becomes a GATT member, the PRC
government would, pursuant to paragraph 5(a), notify
GATT of those "separate customs territories" of China for
which it considers itself to have international responsibility
but on whose behalf it will not accept the General Agree-
ment. These territories would include Hong Kong, Macao
and Taiwan, the three Chinese customs territories which are
separate from that of mainland China and for which the PRC
government would not be in the position to accept GATT
obligations. With respect to Hong Kong and Macao, the
PRC's notification under paragraph 5(a) would seem to serve
a procedural purpose only since these two territories already
are in GATT.108 With respect to Taiwan, however, notifica-
tion would be necessary, as Taiwan would still be outside of
GATT at the time of the PRC's acceptance of the General
Agreement.
(2) After its own entry into GAT, however, the PRC
government would find itself unable to utilize article
XXVI:5(c) to sponsor Taiwan to join GATT because para-
graph 5(c) concerns only a customs territory "in respect of
which a contracting party has accepted this Agreement" (em-
phasis added), not a customs territory that has never applied
the General Agreement before. In other words, for Taiwan
to become a GATT member through PRC's sponsorship
under article XXVI:5(c), the PRC government must have al-
ready accepted GATT on Taiwan's behalf. As the PRC gov-
ernment will not have been able to do so, Taiwan cannot ex-
108. Macao is in a situation similar to that of Hong Kong. As a colony of
Portugal, Macao will be returned to China in 1999 in accordance with the
Joint Declaration on the Question of Macao between the PRC and Portu-
guese governments signed on April 13, 1987, 16 PRC ST. COUNCIL BULL.
549 (1987). Pursuant to the Joint Declaration, Macao will enjoy a high
degree of autonomy similar to that of Hong Kong after its return to China.
including the right to continue its participation in GATT after 1999. Joint
Declaration on the Question of Macao, supra, art. 2; id. annex I, para. 10
(elaboration of the PRC government). Macao applied GAIT under the
responsibility of the Portuguese government. BISD, supra note 32. at 3
(14th Supp. 1966). InJanuary 1991, Macao became a separate contracting
party to GATT under the sponsorship of the Portuguese government pur-
suant to article XXVI:5(c). GATT Doc. L/6806 (1991).
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pect to become a contracting party pursuant to article
XXVI:5(c).
(3) Thus, the only possibility left for Taiwan to join
GATT under article XXVI:5 would be through paragraph
5(b), which provides that the contracting party that has noti-
fied GATT of a paragraph 5(a) exception may give notice to
GATT that its acceptance of GATT will from now on include
the previously excepted separate customs territory. How-
ever, it is obvious that the PRC government would not be
able to give such notice under paragraph 5(b) so long as it
does not have real control over the customs territory of Tai-
wan. And, of course, should the PRC be able to give such a
notice under 5(b), Taiwan would not be a separate con-
tracting party to GATT.'0 9 Therefore, from a strictly legal
perspective, the provisions of article XXVI:5 (sub-
paragraphs (a)-(c)) cannot be applied to the situation of Tai-
wan to resolve the issue of its participation in GATT. As it is
technically impossible for Taiwan to accede to GATT under
article XXVI:5, the only route that is available for Taiwan to
join GATT is through accession under article XXXIII.
2. Article XXXIII
Article XXXIII provides the normal procedures for ac-
cession to GATT under which the contracting parties may
accept a new member upon negotiated terms and by a two-
thirds majority vote. Article XXXIII reads:
A government not party to this Agreement, or a
government acting on behalf of a separate customs
territory possessing full autonomy in the conduct of
its external commercial relations and of the other
matters provided for in this Agreement, may accede
to this Agreement, on its own behalf or on behalf of
that territory, on terms to be agreed between such
government and the Contracting Parties. Decisions
of the Contracting Parties under this paragraph
shall be taken by a two-thirds majority.
According to this provision, two kinds of governments
are eligible to use the accession procedures of article XXX-
III: (i) a government not party to the Agreement acting on its
109. See supra notes 61, 65 and accompanying text.
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own behalf; and (ii) a government acting on behalf of a sepa-
rate customs territory possessing full autonomy in the con-
duct of its external commercial relations and other GAIT
matters. Apparently, the first type of government refers to a
government representing a national state, whereas the sec-
ond type refers to a government that represents a territorial
entity less than a state (but a separate customs territory pos-
sessing full autonomy in its external commercial relations).
Theoretically, the second type of government could be inter-
preted as either a national government acting on behalf of a
separate customs territory which is not part of its national
territory, or a government of the customs territory itself.
The seemingly ambiguous language is of little importance,
however, given that it has already been made clear both in
the legislative intent and in practice that a government less
than a sovereignty is permitted to become a contracting
party to GATT.
The PRC government argues that Taiwan may not ac-
cede to GATT under article XXXIII because there is no pre-
cedent that a government less than a sovereignty may do so.
This argument, however, is not persuasive. First of all, lack
of precedent under a certain provision of law is not a valid
legal reason for not using the provision. A new precedent
can always be created. Second, while it is true that in GATT
practice the governments that have acceded to GATT under
article XXXIII are generally representatives of sovereign
states, there are two possible exceptions: the governments of
West Germany and South Korea." 10 The accessions of West
Germany and South Korea were first considered during the
Torquay negotiations in 1950, which was also the first and
only time in GATT history that the issue of government
qualifications was raised under article XXXIII.III Although
no clear answer was given to this question, it is significant
enough for the purpose of interpreting article XXXIII that
110. See ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 30, art. XXXIII, at 3-5; id. Con-
tracting Parties, at 1-3.
111. The Czechoslovakian delegation protested the admission of the
two countries to the negotiations on the ground that, in its opinion. the
two countries "have no legal capacity to become contracting parties." 2
BISD, supra note 32, at 158-59. West Germany acceded to GAIT on Oc-
tober 1, 1951. 2 id. at 34. South Korea did not accede to GAIT until
April 1967. See 2 id. at 33; 4 id. at 44 (15th Supp. 1968).
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the two governments were both admitted to GATT under
article XXXIII despite the fact that the statehood of the two
countries was in dispute.
Finally, while articles XXXIII and XXVI:5 provide differ-
ent procedures for accession to GATT, the basic eligibility
requirements of a GATT contracting party should be the
same under both provisions. 12 In fact, the language of qual-
ifications of the second type of government under article
XXXIII is almost identical to that of article XXVI:5(c); both
refer to a "customs territory" possessing "full autonomy in
the conduct of its external commercial relations and the
other matters provided for in this Agreement." Hence, if the
government of less than a sovereignty is eligible to become a
GATT contracting party under article XXVI:5, such govern-
ment should be eligible to accede to GATT under article
XXXIII as well." 3 This understanding has been borne out
by GATT practice, as the newly independent countries have
a choice to utilize article XXVI:5 or article XXXIII to accede
to GATT. 114 Thus, it is an unsupported view that article
XXVI:5 applies to non-state customs territories and article
XXXIII is for accession of governments of states only.
3. An Article XXXV Problem
One practical consequence of using article XXXIII pro-
cedures for Taiwan's accession to GATT is the possibility
that Taiwan may opt not to apply GATT relations with the
PRC by invoking article XXXV, given that direct trade with
112. The major procedural differences between articles XXXIII and
XXVI:5 are that accession under article XXXIII is subject to a two-thirds
majority vote, negotiations of a new tariff schedule, and other terms of
membership, whereas membership through sponsorship is almost auto-
matic and does not involve renegotiation of any new term. In addition,
accession under article XXXIII may involve invocation of non-application
of GATT between the acceding party and existing contracting parties
under article XXXV. See infra part III.B.3.
113. Thus, although article XXVI:5 is apparently the right procedure to
use for Hong Kong to become a separate GATT member, theoretically
Hong Kong should also be qualified for accession under article XXXIII.
The treaty-making capacity of Hong Kong as a non-state territorial entity
is a separate issue from the eligibility requirements of article XXXIII. See
supra text accompanying notes 71-76.
114. See supra text accompanying note 98.
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the PRC is still prohibited under Taiwan's current policy.' 15
Paragraph 1 of article XXXV provides for non-application of
the GATT relationship between particular contracting par-
ties if: (a) the two contracting parties have not entered into
tariff negotiations with each other, and (b) either of the con-
tracting parties, at the time either becomes a contracting
party, does not consent to such application.
Because condition (b) refers to "at the time either be-
comes a contracting party," article XXXV can only be in-
voked at the time of accession."t 6 Both the acceding party
and an existing contracting party may invoke the article. In
GAIT history, there have been many invocations of article
XXXV. 117 The most extensive invocations recorded are with
respect to Japan,' 18 although a majority of these invocations
have subsequently been withdrawn.'t 9 There have also been
some invocations of article XXXV against centrally-planned
115. Taipei reportedly is worried that even indirect trade with mainland
China could result in undesirable economic dependence on the mainland.
See Trade Growth with Mainland Worrisome, FREE CHINAJ.,June 21, 1991, at
3; see also Baum, supra note 16; Mainland Claims Taiwan Largest Investor There,
supra note 16; Jeremy Mark, Trade Links with China Alter Taiwanese Economy,
ASIAN WALL ST.J. WKLY., Sept. 2, 1991, at 4.
116. Article XXXV was added to the General Agreement in 1948 as a
result of the changing of the voting requirement from unanimity to a two-
thirds majority in taking the decision on accession under article XXXIII.
The change of voting requirement in article XXXIII raised the possibility
that a contracting party could be forced to enter into the GATT relation
with another country without its consent. Article XXXV was designed to
solve this problem. SeeJACKSON, supra note 32, at 92; ANALYtrcAL INDEX.
supra note 30, art. XXXV, at 1.
117. For the list of all invocations in GATT history and their current
status, see ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 30, art. XXXV, at 3-6, §§ 6-7.
118. Fifteen contracting parties (accounting for 40% ofJapan's exports
to all GATT contracting parties) invoked article XXXV when Japan ac-
ceded to GATT in 1955. See Marco C.E.J. Bronckers, A Legal Analysts of
Protectionist Measures Affecting Japanese Imports in the European Community-Re-
visited, in PROTECTIONISM AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNny 57, 60 (E.LM.
V6lker ed., 1987).
119. The extensive use of article XXXV against Japan caused the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES to conduct several studies of the situation. See GATT
Doc. L/1545, GATT Sales No. 1962-1, reprinted in BISD, supra note 32. at
69 (10th Supp. 1962). Through informal persuasion, as well as collective
pressure, most of the contracting parties eventually withdrew their invoca-
tion of article XXXV. See JACKSON, supra note 32, at 10 1-02. Once the
invocation of article XXXV is withdrawn, it cannot be restored.
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economy countries. 20
As article XXXV can only be invoked in the context of
article XXXIII accession,' 2 ' it is understandable that the
PRC would find it all the more in its interest to argue that
Taiwan can only enter into GATT under article XXVI:5.
However, since article XXXIII procedure is the only appro-
priate one for Taiwan to join GATT, it seems inevitable that
the PRC government will be subject to the possibility of Tai-
wan's invocation of article XXXV in the event that Taiwan is
admitted to GATT. 22 (Of course, Taiwan may decide not to
do so in return for support for its GATT membership.)
C. Is "Resumption" an Obstacle to Taiwan's GA TT
Membership?
In opposing Taiwan's entry into GATT before the PRC,
Beijing argued that while it is negotiating the resumption of
China's original contracting party status in GATT, Taiwan
must wait. Resumption instead of accession as a new mem-
ber is one of the principles that the PRC government has
insisted on with respect to its GATT membership. The ra-
tionale of the PRC's position seems to be that Taiwan, as a
separate Chinese customs territory, cannot be considered for
GATT membership before the issue of China's status as a
contracting party to GATT is resolved.
The PRC's request to resume China's original status in
GATT was made on the ground that the 1950s withdrawal
from GATT by the Nationalist government on behalf of
China was null and void as a matter of international law, be-
120. They include invocations by (South) Korea against Cuba, Czecho-
slovakia, Yugoslavia and Poland and invocations by the United States
against Romania and Hungary. Czechoslovakia and Romania also invoked
article XXXV against Korea. See ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 30, art.
XXXV, at 4-6.
121. In GATT history, a large number of new contracting parties that
acceded to GATT through sponsorship under article XXVI:5(c) inherited
the invocation of article XXXV against Japan from the contracting parties
formerly responsible for their customs territories. However, such invoca-
tion of article XXXV by a new contracting party acceding to GATT upon
sponsorship under article XXVI:5 against an existing contracting party is
limited to the situation of inheritance only. See ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra
note 30, art. XXXV, at 3-6, §§ 6-7.
122. It is unclear how this would affect the current indirect trade be-
tween the two sides of the Taiwan Straits.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
1096
GATT MEMBERSHIP FOR TA!4 WN
cause the only lawful government of China at that time was
the PRC which had effective control over mainland China as
of October 1, 1949. The PRC's position on the invalidity of
the 1950s withdrawal is consistent with the 1971 U.N. Reso-
lution on China, which restored the China seat to the PRC,
and conforms with international legal principle regarding
the effect of government recognition.' 23
1. The Legal Effect of Non-Application of GATT
The invalidity of the 1950s withdrawal, although the
source of the problem, is not really an issue with GATT.'2 4
What is at issue here is the continuing validity of China's
contracting party status to the General Agreement after non-
application of the Agreement between China and other con-
tracting parties over a period of more than forty years-a pe-
riod almost equal to the entire life of GATT--during which
substantial changes have occurred both in China and in
GATT. The question of China's contracting party status in
GATT is, in essence, a question for the law of treaties.
Under the law of treaties, the non-application (or discontinu-
ance in force) of the General Agreement between China and
GATT contracting parties may be regarded as a result of
either suspension or termination of the operation of the
treaty between China and other contracting parties.' 25 By
requesting "resumption" of its contracting party status, the
PRC government clearly indicated its interpretation of the
situation as a "suspension" rather than a "termination" of
GATT relations.1 26 However, suspension of the operation
of a treaty generally requires an understanding of the parties
123. See supra text accompanying note 11.
124. So far as GATT is concerned, there is no question as to the right of
the PRC government to represent China. See supra text accompanying
notes 43-44.
125. Part V of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, entitled
"Invalidity, Termination and Suspension of the Operation of Treaties."
categorizes the situations of non-application of treaties. Vienna Conven-
tion, supra note 88, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 342.
126. If termination is the case, accession under article XXXIII would be
in order. For a detailed legal analysis on the issue of resumption versus
accession with respect to the PRC's membership in GATT. see Ya Qjn,
China and GATT: Toward a Meaningful Participation? 374 (1990) (un-
published SJ.D. dissertation, Harvard University Law School. available in
Harvard Law School Library).
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involved, either through express consent of the parties or by
virtue of the provisions in the treaty. 127 In this case, the un-
derstanding of the situation has been anything but clear.
Until the PRC's request for resumption of China's GATT
status, GATT and its contracting parties consistently treated
the non-application of GATT with respect to China as the
result of termination of the treaty, although on a legally in-
correct ground. 28
More important, both the Chinese economic and trade
system and the GATT system have undergone substantial
changes during the period of non-application. In brief, the
nature and quantity of China's trade barriers have changed
dramatically since the PRC adopted a centrally-planned eco-
nomic system and expanded its foreign trade relations. In
the GATT system, the number of the contracting parties has
increased to more than one hundred and the average level of
tariffs has been substantially lowered. Given the extent of
these changes, it is arguable that under the law of treaties, a
fundamental change of circumstances has occurred, thereby
terminating the rights and obligations of the 1947 Protocol
between China and other contracting parties.12 9
In fact, both the PRC government and GATT con-
tracting parties have agreed that China's re-entry into GATT
127. See Vienna Convention, supra note 88, art. 57, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 345
(providing that suspension may take effect either "[iln conformity with the
provisions of the treaty" or "by consent of all the parties after consultation
with the other contracting states").
128. GATT consistently treated the withdrawal as a valid action, which is
reflected in all relevant GATT official documents and materials. The PRC
government did not clarify its understanding of the situation until it re-
quested resumption in July 1986. See Qn, supra note 126.
129. See Vienna Convention, supra note 88, art. 62, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 347
(Fundamental Changes of Circumstances (rebus sic stantibus)). Under ar-
ticle 62, the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus may be invoked as a basis for
terminating a treaty if "the existence of those circumstances constituted an
essential basis of the consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty; and
the effect of the change is radically to transform the extent of obligations
still to be performed under the treaty." Id. See generally OliverJ. Lissitzyn,
Treaties and Changed Circumstances, 61 AM.J. INT'L L. 895 (1967) (discussing
terminating treaties under the doctrine); Gy6rgy Haraszti, Treaties and the
Fundamental Change of Circumstances, 146 RECUEIL DES GOURS 1 (1975). For
history development and application of the doctrine, see ATiIANASSIOS
VAMVOUKOS, TERMINATION OF TREATIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 5-11
(1985).
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will have to be based on new terms subject to negotiation.
The PRC government suggested a "resumption-in-form-
only" approach:
[H]aving taken into account the contractual nature
of the General Agreement, we agree to enter into
substantive negotiations with contracting parties for
the resumption of China's contracting party status
and set the rights and obligations. In view of con-
siderable changes having taken place during the
suspension of relations between China and GATT,
my government proposes to take a non-retroactive
approach to issues occurred during the period of
suspension. This approach would be in the interest
of all parties.130
As realistic as it attempts to be, this resumption-in-form-
only approach is legally unsound and impossible to pursue
under the particular legal structure of GATT.
2. The Fallacy of the PRC's Resumption Approach
The most peculiar aspect of the GATT legal system is
that the General Agreement itself has never entered into
force. 31 Instead, the provisions of the General Agreement
have been brought into application by a series of protocols-
the 1947 Protocol of Provisional Application and the numer-
ous subsequent accession protocols-entered into between
and among the contracting parties.' 32 Each of these proto-
cols sets forth specific terms and conditions under which a
130. Statement by Shenjueren, Deputy Minister of the Ministry of For-
eign Economic Relations and Trade of the PRC and head of the Chinese
Delegation to GATT, at the Third Session of GATT Working Party on
China held on April 26, 1988, in Geneva.
131. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
132. A protocol of accession typically provides that the acceding party
"'shall apply to contracting parties provisionally and subject to this Proto-
col: (a) Parts I, III and IV of the General Agreement, and (b) Part II of the
General Agreement to the fullest extent not inconsistent with its legisla-
tion existing on the date of this Protocol." The protocols of accession for
certain centrally-planned economies, i.e., Poland, Romania and Hungary.
contain additional substantive obligations not provided for in the provi-
sions of the General Agreement. See BISD, supra note 32, at 52 (15th
Supp. 1968); idt at 10 (18th Supp. 1972); id. at 3 (20th Supp. 1974). For a
general introduction to GATT and centrally-planned economics, sce M.M.
KOSTECKI, EAST-WEsT TRADE AND THE GATT SYSTEM (1979).
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particular contracting party undertakes to apply the provi-
sions of the General Agreement to other contracting parties.
The tariff schedule of a particular contracting party is also
annexed to its applicable protocol. Each of these protocols,
therefore, is a separate multilateral treaty under interna-
tional law.133 As far as China is concerned, the 1947 Proto-
col is the treaty that brought it into GATT relations with the
other twenty-one original contracting parties. Thus, in order
to resume such GATT relations, the PRC would have to re-
sume the application of the 1947 Protocol.
It is unlikely that contracting parties could resume
GATT relations with China on the terms of the 1947 Proto-
col because of the substantial changes over the last four de-
cades. As explained above, it is understood between China
and GATT contracting parties that new terms, including a
new tariff schedule for China, would have to be negotiated,
and a new legal instrument incorporating these terms would
have to be concluded. However, once a new agreement is
concluded between the PRC and GATT contracting parties
regarding to the application of GATT, the 1947 Protocol will
be superseded with respect to China as a matter of interna-
tional law. According to article 59(1) of the Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties:
A treaty shall be considered as terminated if all the
parties to it conclude a later treaty relating to the
same subject-matter and:
(a) It appears from the later treaty or is other-
wise established that the parties intended that the
matter should be governed by that treaty; or
(b) The provisions of the later treaty are so far
incompatible with those of the earlier one that the
two treaties are not capable of being applied at the
same time.134
There is no question that the new agreement between the
PRC government and the GATT contracting parties would
relate to the same subject-matter as that of the 1947 Proto-
133. The 1947 Protocol and all the accession protocols are registered
with the U.N. Secretariat in accordance with the requirement of treaty re-
gistration under article 102 of the U.N. Charter.
134. Vienna Convention, supra note 88, art. 59(1), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 345-
46.
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col-the application of the General Agreement between
China and the other contracting parties-and that all the
parties to the new agreement would intend that the matter of
China's application of GATT be governed by the new agree-
ment, not the 1947 Protocol. Obviously, the contents of the
new agreement, including the new tariff schedule, would be
so incompatible with those of the 1947 Protocol that the two
instruments could not be applied simultaneously. One may
question whether the 1947 Protocol could be deemed termi-
nated with respect to China if "all the parties" to the 1947
Protocol do not enter into the new agreement, as explicitly
required under article 59.135 Under the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, it is possible to have a multilateral
treaty terminated with respect to one party only.'5 6 Since
the 1947 Protocol has not been in use with respect to China,
whether it would be considered "terminated" between China
and an existing contracting party to the 1947 Protocol which
would not enter into the new agreement with China is of
neither practical nor legal consequence.13 7
There is also a technical obstacle standing in the way of
China's resumption of the 1947 Protocol. The 1947 Proto-
135. Artide XXXV of the General Agreement allows non-application of
GATT between particular contracting parties provided the decision is
made at the time a country is acceding to GATT under article XXXIII. See
supra note 116 and accompanying text. One of the legal issues involved in
resumption versus accession in the China case is whether under resump-
tion article XXXV can still be invoked. Since resumption would be impos-
sible, the PRG would accede to GATT under article XXXIII. Accordingly.
article XXXV would be invocable at the time of the PRC's accession.
136. Article 60(2) of the Vienna Convention provides that "[a] material
breach of a multilateral treaty by one of the parties entitles the other par-
ties by unanimous agreement... to terminate it either (i) in the relations
between themselves and the defaulting State, or (ii) as between all the par-
ties." Vienna Convention, supra note 88, art. 60(2), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 346.
In theory, contracting parties could argue that if China considered its
GATT relations still valid, China's failure to carry out any of its GAIT
obligations constituted a material breach of the treaty. See supra notes 126-
28 and accompanying text.
137. Article 30 of the Vienna Convention, concerning application of
successive treaties relating to the same subject-matter, provides that when
the parties to the later treaty do not include all the parties to the earlier
one, "[a]s between a State party to both treaties and a State party to only
one of the treaties, the treaty to which both States are parties governs their
mutual rights and obligations." Vienna Convention, supra note 88. art. 30.
1155 U.N.T.S. at 339.
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col is a treaty effective only among its contracting parties
(currently nineteen in total, excluding China). ' 38 Thus, even
if the PRC could resume China's original contracting party
status by relying on the 1947 Protocol, it would still need to
enter into a new agreement with the rest of the GATT con-
tracting parties (including all the acceding contracting par-
ties) with respect to the application of GATT between them.
The legal complications involved in reconciling the two
agreements make such an arrangement unlikely to happen.
In sum, assuming that the 1947 Protocol is currently
suspended between China and other original contracting
parties, the logic that the conclusion of a new agreement be-
tween the Chinese government and other GATT contracting
parties relating to the application of GATT inevitably would
replace the 1947 Protocol with respect to China makes it im-
possible for the PRC to resume China's original contracting
party status. This conclusion will stand regardless of
whether the new agreement should be titled the "protocol of
resumption" or "joint declaration on the resumption of
China's status as a contracting party to GATT," 139 as termi-
nation of a treaty may be implied by the conclusion of a later
treaty of the same subject-matter. 140 Of course, because it is
technically impossible for the PRC to resume China's origi-
nal contracting party status in GATT, the resumption argu-
ment cannot prevail in opposing Taiwan's application for
GATT membership.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The question of whether Taiwan may legally accede to
GATT in its own right can be answered by referring to the
law of GATT and the law of treaties. Under GATT law, Tai-
wan apparently meets the requirements of GATT member-
ship as a separate customs territory possessing full autonomy
in the conduct of its external commercial relations and other
matters provided for in the General Agreement. The pur-
138. See ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 30, Protocol, at 1.
139. It was suggested, for instance, that the legal instrument for "re-
sumption" should be in the form of a "joint declaration" instead of a
"protocol." See Li, supra note 48, at 46.
140. Vienna Convention, supra note 88, art. 59, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 345-
46.
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poses and particular nature of GATT legal obligations also
justify Taiwan's independent membership.
Under the law of treaties, the question of Taiwan's qual-
ification for GATT membership is a question of Taiwan's
treaty-making capacity as a non-state territorial entity. Be-
cause Taiwan does not fit into any usual category of non-
state territorial entities recognized under international law,
there is no ready answer to this question. In practice, Tai-
wan has been acting internationally as an independent entity.
The Taipei government has engaged in foreign relations,
and Taiwan has entered into international agreements of
various purposes with countries that do not maintain diplo-
matic relations with it. GATT membership for Taiwan
would add to the evidence in international law that Taiwan
possesses treaty-making capacity for specific purposes.
The PRC government's position that Taiwan, as a terri-
torial component of China, has no right to function interna-
tionally without the approval of the PRC government would
find support under international law if Taiwan were not
under the effective control of its political rival. However, the
legal character of PRC-Taiwan relations, which is inherently
"domestic" under international law, prevents Beijing from
resorting to any international agreement or legal principle to
bolster its position. In practice, the PRC's acceptance of Tai-
wan's equal participation in certain other inter-governmental
organizations, e.g., the Asian Development Bank, does not
appear to be legally consistent with its position on Taiwan's
GATT membership.
At the level of GATT procedure, Taiwan's accession to
GATT can be accomplished only through article XXXIII of
the General Agreement. The PRC government's contrary
argument, that Taiwan is not a national government and
thus cannot accede to GATT under article XXXIII and in-
stead must wait for sponsorship from Beijing, cannot be sup-
ported. The procedure under article XXVI:5, pursuant to
which an autonomous customs territory may become a
GATT member upon the sponsorship of a responsible con-
tracting party, is applicable only to a situation in which the
acceding territory has already been applying the General
Agreement prior to its accession by virtue of the acceptance
of GATT by its responsible contracting party on its behalf.
Since Taiwan has not been applying GATT, and since the
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PRC will not be able to accept GATT on Taiwan's behalf
even if it joins GATT first, article XXVI:5 is technically not
applicable to the situation of Taiwan. By comparison, the
plain language of article XXXIII suggests that a government
of a non-state customs territory may accede to GATT pursu-
ant to its provision. The fact that in GATT practice govern-
ments with disputable legal status (i.e., West Germany and
South Korea) were permitted to use the article XXXIII pro-
cedure for accession to GATT also supports the view that
article XXXIII is not restricted to use by national govern-
ments. While articles XXXIII and XXVI:5 provide different
procedures for accession, the basic eligibility requirements
of an acceding government are the same under both provi-
sions. For these reasons, article XXXIII is the correct proce-
dure under which Taiwan may apply for accession to GATT.
The PRC's position that Taiwan's participation in
GATT should not be considered before the PRC resumes
China's original contracting party status in GATT cannot be
sustained because of the fallacy of the resumption approach.
Given the substantial change of circumstances in the last
forty years, resumption of China's original contracting party
status is practically impossible under the peculiar legal struc-
ture of GATT. The resumption-in-formality-only approach
adopted by the PRC government is legally unsound and im-
possible to pursue in a legally coherent manner.
The PRC government's argument that Taiwan's mem-
bership in GATT without Beijing's approval would cause a
"two-China" problem is legally groundless, given that Taipei
has applied for GATT membership as a separate customs
territory of China, and not as the state of China.
On the whole, the PRC government's position on Tai-
wan's application for GATT membership is not founded
upon solid legal ground. The GATT membership rivalry be-
tween Beijing and Taipei is a continuation of their political
rivalry in the contemporary context. Thus, for GATT and
GATT contracting parties, the question of whether to admit
Taiwan to the organization in its own right, regardless of
Beijing's opposition, is essentially a political issue rather
than a legal one.
As a policy matter, GATT membership for Taiwan, as it
is for any other independent trading area, would be consis-
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tent with the pronounced objectives of GATT. Given Tai-
wan's considerable trading power, its undertaking of GATT
obligations certainly would be beneficial to the development
of world trade.
The legal significance of GATT membership for Taiwan
is rather limited, since such membership would not change
Taiwan's ambiguous status in international law in any funda-
mental way. Nevertheless, GATT membership would testify
to Taiwan's treaty-making capacity as a non-state territorial
entity, which would lend to the legitimacy of the island in
seeking more participation and recognition in international
relations.
Taiwan's application for GATT membership has forced
the world to confront an issue that it has shunned over the
past decades-the proper status of Taiwan in the interna-
tional community. Hopefully, this new attention to the issue
will lead to a solution that meets the need for peace and
prosperity of the region, the right of the Taiwan people to
participate in world affairs, and the goal of national unifica-
tion.
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